

Beginners Guide to Basic Linux Anti Anti Debugging Techniques

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Abstract

Anti-debugging techniques are a common method for protecting software applications. Meanwhile such kind of protection tricks are often used, several approaches work against such kind of protection. One known method are anti-anti tricks which circumvent the mentioned protection schemes. This paper confines to techniques and methods used for Linux platform applications, especiall dealing with the operation platforms specific tools.

Keywords: Software Protection; Reverse Code Engineering; Linux; Anti-Debugging; Anti-Anti-Debugging

1. Introduction

This paper is an introduction for anti anti debugging techniques on the linux OS. It covers the very basic anti debugging techniques as introduced by Silvio Cesare's paper [1] (back in 1999). As I see those techniques are still used in applications and crackmes, this paper should show a) how easy and outdated those techniques are, and b) explain why ptrace() and objdump are not always your friends, but finally there is always a way. Well, as in the mentioned paper one anti dissassembling trick (or better anti objdump trick) is described I will discuss it here as well. Actually there were two basic tricks used, I will seperate them, and describe more detailed.

2 False Disassembly

A common used disassembler used is objdump, or disassembler projects that base on objdumps output. Actually there are several ways how to fool objdump as a disassembler.

2.1 Jumping into the middle of an instruction

Let's take the following code as example:

```
start:
    jmp label+1
label: DB 0x90
    mov eax, 0xf001
```

The above code is not yet the "trick", just to have the visibility of the problem. As behind label there follows a single byte opcode 0x90 (nop), the jmp label+1 is NO problem for objdump, as we did not jump into the middle of an instruction:

```
# objdump -d -M intel anti01
anti01: file format elf32-i386
```

Disassembly of section .text:

```
08048080 <start>:
8048080: e9 01 00 00 00 jmp 8048086 <label+0x1>

08048085 <label>:
8048085: 90 nop
8048086: b8 01 f0 00 00 mov eax,0xf001
```

the code was dissasembled correctly. Now when using an instruction which assembles into more than 1 byte objdump will not follow this jump, it will just dissassemble linear from start to end.

```
start:
    jmp label+1
label: DB     0xE9
    mov     eax, 0xf001

# objdump -M intel -d anti02
anti02:     file format elf32-i386
```

Disassembly of section .text:

```
08048080 <start>:
8048080: e9 01 00 00 00 jmp 8048086 <label+0x1>

08048085 <label>:
8048085: e9 b8 01 f0 00 jmp 8f48242 <__bss_start+0xeff1b6>
```

So the disassembly is false, objdump ignored the jump destination and disassembled the instruction directly following the first jmp. As we placed an 0xe9 byte there, objdump displays it also as a jmp instruction. Our mov instruction got "hidden".

2.1.1 How to circumvent this problem

To be able to use objdump you have to manually replace the bogus 0xE9 byte with a hexeditor. Of course this helps only for disassembling. As the file is then modified it could behave different when it checksums itself. A better choice is to use a disassembler like bastard [2], IDA [3], or any other that does control flow analysis. For example when disassembling the same executable (antia02) with lida [4], the result looks like this:

```
---- section .text ----:
08048080 E9 01 00 00 00 jmp Label_08048086
; (08048086)
; (near + 0x1)
08048085 DB E9

Label_08048086:
08048086 B8 01 F0 00 00 mov eax, 0xF001
; xref ( 08048080 )
```

which is correct, so using the right tools you would not even recognize a trick here.

2.2 Runtime calculation of destination address

Another trick, to fool even control flow disassemblers is to calculate the destination of jumps during runtime. For doing so, the current EIP is to be retreived and then the difference to the address of the destination from current EIP is added. To retrieve EIP, the common call+pop "technique" is used, as the call instruction stores the return address on the stack, which nobody prevents us to pop it into a register. Here a scheme of a more advanced example than above:

```
call earth+1
Return:
               ; x instructions or random bytes here
                                                                xb
               ; earth = Return + x
earth:
   xor
         eax, eax; align disassembly, using single byte opcode
                                                                       1b
               ; start of function: get return address ( Return ) 1b
   pop
               ; y instructions or random bytes here
                                                                уb
   add eax, x+2+y+2+1+1+z; x+y+z+6
                                                          2b
   push eax
               ;
                                                          1b
                                                          1b
                ; z instructions or random bytes here
                                                                   zb
; Code:
               ; !! Code Continues Here !!
```

Now an implementation could look like below. I have used for x and z just one byte, again E9, as it eats so many bytes. For Code I have chosen 3 nops, as they are good visible in the outputs you will see:

```
; antia.s
        earth+1
call
earth: DB 0xE9
                           <--- pushed return address,
                            E9 is opcode for jmp to disalign disas-
                            sembly
                eax
                      ; 1
                          hidden
          pop
          nop
                      ; 1
                eax, 9 ; 2
                            hidden
          add
                      ; 1
                           hidden
                eax
          push
         ret
                      ; 1
                           hidden
                      ; 1
     DB 0xE9
                           opcode for jmp to misalign disassembly
Code:
        ; code continues here <--- pushed return address + 9
         nop
          nop
         nop
         ret
 ______
```

I used nasm -f elf antia.s to create the object file. Of course objdump will be fooled allready by the first trick "calling earth+1".

```
# objdump -d antia.o
antia.o: file format elf32-i386
```

Disassembly of section .text:

```
000000000 <earth-0x5>:
    0: e8 01 00 00 00 call 6 <earth+0x1>

000000005 <earth>:
    5: e9 58 90 05 09 jmp 9059062 <earth+0x905905d>
    a: 00 00 add %al,(%eax)
    c: 00 50 c3 add %dl,0xffffffc3(%eax)
    f: e9 90 90 90 c3 jmp c39090a4 <earth+0xc390909f>
```

As result you can see our code (3 nops) is fully hidden here at addres 0xf. But not only that, also our calculation of EIP is totally hidden for objdump. Indeed this disassembly is totally different than what was coded. But our example not only was good for fooling objdump. Now look, what IDA outputs:

```
.text:08000000 ; Segment permissions: Read/Execute
                         segment para public 'CODE' use32
.text:08000000 _text
.text:08000000
                         assume cs:_text
.text:08000000
                         org 8000000h
.text:08000000
                         assume es:nothing, ss:nothing, ds:_text,
.text:08000000
                                 fs:nothing, gs:nothing
                         dd 1E8h
.text:08000000
.text:08000004 ; ------
.text:08000004
                         add cl, ch
.text:08000006
                                eax
                          pop
.text:08000007
                          nop
.text:08000008
                          add
                                 eax, 9
.text:0800000D
                          push
                                 eax
.text:0800000E
                         retn
.text:0800000E ; ------
.text:0800000F
                          dd 909090E9h
.text:08000013 ;
.text:08000013
                          retn
.text:08000013 _text
                          ends
.text:08000013
.text:08000013
.text:08000013
```

Well, I do not know why, but IDA did not like the call +1 instruction. After all at least it shows the calculation of EIP, but not from where was called, so you can not immediately say where the code finally will continue after the retn instruction. I have loaded the same file into lida as well:

```
---- section .text ----:
08048080 E8 01 00 00 00
                                 call
                                            Function_08048086
                                 ; (08048086) ; (near + 0x1)
08048085 DB E9
Function_08048086:
08048086 58
                                 qoq
                                            eax ; xref
                                                      ;( 08048080 )
08048087 90
                                 nop
08048088 05 09 00 00 00 00 0804808D 50
                                 add
                                            eax, 0x9
                                 push
                                            eax
0804808E C3
                                 ret
0804808F E9 90 90 90 C3
                                            CB951124
                                 jmp
                                 ;(near - 0x3C6F6F70)
08048094 DB 00, 54, 68, 65, 20, 4E, 65, 74, 77, 69, 64, 65, 20, 41, 73, 73
```

Actually this looks better. Until the ret instruction it is exactly what we have coded. But still the last hurdle is that no disassembler can tell where the code after the ret instruction will continue, until it does code emulation. In this example we could see the crossreference to the call from address 08048080. So we could calculate the return address and tell the disassembler to start at address 08048090.

2.2.1 How to circumvent this trick

Actually there is no automated way which is 100% accurate. Possibly when a disassembler does code emulation it could do a complete correct disassembly. In reality this is not a big problem, as when using interactive disassemblers you can tell the disassembler where the parts of the code start. Also while debugging you would see what is really going on. This is why I would call those techniques "anti disassembling" techniques.

3. Detecting Breakpoints

The first technique described by Silvio Cesare is really easy to circumvent:

As described, gdb sets breakpoints by replacing the byte at the address to break with an int 3 opcode, which is 0xcc. So it is easy for a program to check addresses for 0xcc presence, as above. When running the program, it says "Hello":), also when running it in gdb. Actually if we place a breakpoint at the function foo, and run, gdb will not break and we will see the output "BREAKPOINT".

```
# gdb ./x
GNU gdb 6.0-2
Copyright 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i586-linux-gnu"...Using host libthread_db library "/
lib/tls/libthread_db.so.1".

gdb> bp foo
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804838c
gdb> run
BREAKPOINT

Program exited with code 01.
```

3.1 How to circumvent this trick

Well this is also very easy. To avoid this problem but still be able to break into foo, just look at the disassembly and simply choose your breakpoint not exactly at the functions entrypoint:

```
0804838c <foo>:
 804838c:
                55
                                         push
                                                 ebp
 804838d:
                89 e5
                                         mov
                                                 ebp,esp
                83 ec 08
804838f:
                                         sub
                                                 esp,0x8
 8048392:
                83 ec 0c
                                                 esp,0xc
                                         sub
 8048395:
                68 c8 84 04 08
                                                 0x80484c8
                                         push
 804839a:
                e8 Od ff ff ff
                                         call
                                                 80482ac <_init+0x38>
 804839f:
                83 c4 10
                                         add
                                                 esp,0x10
 80483a2:
                с9
                                         leave
 80483a3:
                c3
                                         ret
```

So we can set the breakpoint on all those addresses !=0x804838c. I should mention, that the problem with this anti breakpoint technique is not in circumventing it, but to detect it. In this example obviously you will realize it, because the program tells it. In real life it would probably not print something out, but your breakpoint will simply not break. To find the comparison you could either search the disassembly for your address to break for example:

and examine the code after 80483b4. But this potentially could not help you, since the address could be calculated as well. You could also use a short perl script to find all occurences of an operand 0xcc like

```
#!/usr/bin/perl
while(<>)
{
   if($= =~ m/([0-9a-f][4]:\s*[0-9a-f \t]*.*0xcc)/ ){ print; }
}
and run it as a filter for objdump:
# objdump -M intel -d x | ./antibp.pl
80483be: 3d cc 00 00 00 cmp eax,0xcc
```

which will give you the address of the compare. Now you can either change the byte 0xcc to 0x00 or nop the instruction out, or do anything you like. Should the code check itself for any changes in the function where the compare is done (in this example main()), changing the 0xcc byte would be detected. It is possible, that not only the functions entrypoint, but the whole function is being checked for 0xcc bytes in a loop. Therefore you can manually place an ICEBP (0xF1) instruction into foo() with a hexeditor or gdb instead of an INT 3. ICEBP also causes gdb to break. And no 0xCC byte is detected, of course.

4. Detecting debugging

This program checks if it could let it debug itself, by trying to set a debugging request to itself. Now if the program is being debugged by gdb, this call to ptrace() fails, as there can only be one debugger. The failure of the call indicates the program it is being debugged.

4.1 How to circumvent this trick (Method 1)

Obviously as this check is only working for debuggers using ptrace(), any debugger not using ptrace() can be used. Alternatively one can patch/wrap the ptrace() function which is a more advanced task. Easier is to either "nop out" the ptrace() call or the checking afterwards. To comfortably be able to do so, we need to find where this ptrace() check is done. If the executable in the unlikely case was compiled without the -s switch (-s Remove all symbol table and relocation information from the executable) then this is very easy:

So ptrace is called by the address 080482c0 in this executable. Simply typing:

shows us where ptrace gets called. Now we can do whatever we like. But before, what to do if the -s option was used while compiling? Then objdump does not show us the output as above. For the above example we can do that easily by using gdb:

```
# qdb test_debug
GNU gdb 6.0-2
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welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i586-linux-gnu"...Using host libthread_db
library "/lib/tls/libthread_db.so.1".
gdb> bp ptrace
Breakpoint 1 at 0x80482c0
gdb> run
Breakpoint 1 at 0x400e02f0

      eax:00000000 ebx:40143218
      ecx:00000001
      edx:4014449C
      eflags:00200246

      esi:BFFFF5E4 edi:BFFFF570
      esp:BFFFF53C
      ebp:BFFFF558
      eip:400E02F0

      cs:0073 ds:007B
      es:007B
      fs:0000 gs:0033
      ss:007B
      o d I t s Z a P c

[007B:BFFFF53C]-----[stack]
BFFFF56C : C4 A9 00 40 18 32 14 40 - 00 00 00 00 70 F5 FF BF ...@.2.@....p...
BFFFF55C : A0 BE 03 40 01 00 00 - E4 F5 FF BF EC F5 FF BF ...@........
[007B:BFFFF5E4]-----[data]
BFFFF5E4 : 8A F7 FF BF 00 00 00 00 - B1 F7 FF BF C0 F7 FF BF ......
[0073:400E02F0]-----[code]
0x400e02f0 <ptrace>: push %ebp
0x400e02f1 <ptrace+1>:
                    mov
                           %esp,%ebp
0x400e02f6 <ptrace+6>: mov
                          %edi,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
0x400e02fc <ptrace+12>: mov
                          0xc(%ebp),%ecx
Breakpoint 1, 0x400e02f0 in ptrace () from /lib/tls/libc.so.6
gdb>
```

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What we have done is set a breakpoint on ptrace() itself. Now after typing pret we are back in the test_debug executable:

gdb> pret

```
eflags:00200246
   eax:FFFFFFF ebx:40143218 ecx:FFFFFFF edx:FFFFFF00
   esi:BFFFF5E4 edi:BFFFF570 esp:BFFFF540 ebp:BFFFF558
                                         eip:080483D9
   cs:0073 ds:007B es:007B fs:0000 gs:0033 ss:007B od I t s Z a P c
[007B:BFFFF540]-----[stack]
BFFFF570 : 18 32 14 40 00 00 00 00 - 70 F5 FF BF B8 F5 FF BF .2.@....p.....
BFFFF560 : 01 00 00 00 E4 F5 FF BF - EC F5 FF BF C4 A9 00 40 ......@
BFFFF550 : 00 00 00 00 40 44 01 40 - B8 F5 FF BF A0 BE 03 40 ....@D.@.....@
BFFFF540 : 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .......
[007B:BFFFF5E4]-----[data]
[0073:080483D9]-----[code]
0x80483d9 <main+29>: add
                    $0x10,%esp
0x80483dc <main+32>: test %eax,%eax
0x080483d9 in main ()
```

From here we also see by where we landed, the return address from ptrace(). Now we can patch the file and nop out the jns instruction, or change the eax register during runtime.

```
gdb> set $eax=0
gdb> c
everything ok

Program exited with code 016.

No registers.
qdb>
```

So everything is OK although we were debugging. That is fine!

4.2 How to circumvent this trick (Method 2)

Another option to bypass the debugger would be to write your own ptrace() function, which as a minimum always returns 0. Then the LD_PRELOAD environment variable can be set to point the executable to the own ptrace() function. Example: First we make a test executable, that implements the anti debugging technique:

compile it with # gcc antiptrace.c -o antiptrace.

Then we will use a simple ptrace() function and build a shared object of it:

```
// -- ptrace.c --
int ptrace(int i, int j, int k, int 1)
        printf(" PTRACE CALLED!\n");
// -- EOF --
compile it with
# gcc -shared ptrace.c -o ptrace.so
running the program, it prints:
# ./antiptrace
Hello World!
runnig it in gdb, it prints:
# gdb ./antiptrace
GNU gdb 6.0-2
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welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i586-linux-gnu"...Using host libthread_db
library "/lib/tls/libthread_db.so.1".
qdb> run
DEBUGGER PRESENT!
Program exited with code 01.
```

Now we can use our own ptrace function by setting the environment variable LD_PRELOAD for our executable. In gdb this is done by:

```
gdb> set environment LD_PRELOAD ./ptrace.so
gdb> run
   PTRACE CALLED!
Hello World!
Program exited with code 015.
gdb>
```

We can see the executable did not detect the debugger and our ptrace() function was called.

5. Conclusions

These anti debugging (and anti anti) techniques are the very basic ones, all relying on gdb is used as debugger, and are easy to defeat as you can see.

About the Author: Henry Miller (pseudonym 0xf001) works as independant IT consultant in the field of large scaled UNIX environments. He is a specialist in systems monitoring integration from kernel messages to business services including host security tasks. His first contact with Assembly language programming goes back to C64 computer systems. Additionally he has done several research in the field of protection analysis and broke most commercial protection systems so far. One additional research field is the analysis of virus code and malicious code, coping mainly with retro viruses of the DOS times. He developed full stealth polymorphic software system. Several tools for reverse code engineering tasks have been developed by him as well, especially for th Linux operating system.

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